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ABSTRACT
This research is based on a case study of a Japanese 
company in the United States. The study traces the change 
in the perceptions of the Japanese management through 
ethnographic information collected from interviews with the 
Japanese and Americans as well as from extensive 
observations of the company.
When the company began its operation three years ago, 
the Japanese management emphasized the importance of 
establishing a community model: the managers attempted to 
create a ’family” atmosphere within the office.
However, the combination of various factors including 
growth in business, cultural difference, and the Japanese 
monopoly of power led to the erosion of the community mode1 
in the office. All these factors created a duality within 
the office incompatible with the community model.
As a result, after three years since the establishment 
of the company, the priority of the Japanese managers has 
shifted from a "family" model to an effort to control their 
American staff members through a "manual," which 
mechanTcally defines the content and methodology of parh 
individual's job.
JAPANESE BUSINESS IN. THE UNITED STATES 
UNINTENTIONAL DEFINITION OF THE OTHER
Chapter I 
Introducti on
The number of Japanese companies in the United States 
has grown rapidly in the past decade as direct investment
from Japan has increased from $1.6 billion in 1980 to $22.3 
billion in 1988. The increase in the manufacturing sector 
has been even more dramatic as investment has grown 23 times 
in eight years, or $0.4 billion to $9.1 billion (OECD 1989:
97). By deciding to establish transplants in the United 
States in order to cope with the increasing value of the yen 5 ^
and U.S.-Japan trade friction, large Japanese manufacturers 
lead this trend. In turn, the large Japanese manufacturers 
encourage smaller Japanese suppliers to establish their 
plants and offices in the United States. This influx of 
Japanese companies is likely to continue: one estimate
reports that by the turn of the century, 850,000 to one 
million Americans will be employed by Japanese companies
(Rehder 1990: 87).
The increase in Japanese companies in the United States^)
  —   —---- ■—       — — 
has started to draw attention from scholars. Johnson and viasUk .
Ouchi, for example, conducted a case study in 1974 of Sony
2
3Corporation in California and praised its management style 
for accomplishing successful plant productivity. However, 
recent assessments of Japanese firms in the United States 
have been more cautious. Kidahashi saw the presence of clear 
duality between the Japanese and Americans in a Japanese 
secuxities firm (1987). Other case studies also report the
irvt»o/'-'-7"c5
conflict of two cultures and nationalities within one i
1
organization. In his comprehensive assessment of Japanese
transplants in the United States, Rehder says that the
"honeymoon" is over and indicates a number of potential
problems (1990) . Popular magazines and newspaper articles^.
have also begun pointing to the culture clash seen in
"2
U.S.-based Japanese firms.____
The case study conducted in this paper is considerably ^ ^
smaller in scale than the other studies that have focused on
large Japanese corporations. The subject of this study,
Metric Tools International, Inc. (MTI), is a small, young
company established in the United States in order to cater
3
to a larger Japanese firm. Three-year-old MTI, a joint 
venture of large and small Japanese firms, is comprised of\ 
four Japanese managers and six American staff members.
Unlike large corporations such as Sony, MTI's financial and 
human resources are limited. The management, with no 
assurance of success, is groping its way through many <>
uncertainties in this foreign land.
4My intention is not to draw any universal conclusiory^W^\c 
about Japanese firms in the United States from this case 
study of one small Japanese company. Rather, this study 
provides a view of the human interaction in a U.S.-based 
Japanese office between the Japanese and Americans, neither 
of whom has a profound understanding of their counterpart's 
culture. I have focused my attention on the perspectives o>f>j^„, 
the Japanese because, as a Japanese student in American 
Studies who once worked with the other Japanese at MTI, I 
was more interested in their ideas and visions of America.
From the ethnographic information I collected, I intend to 
demonstrate how the Japanese perceptions of America and 
Americans have shifted since the company's establishment.
To show this shift in perceptions, I will begin in the 
second chapter with a portrait of MTI as well as an
explanation of the methodological background of this case ^
study. Next, I have set up three ethnographically-based 
chapters in which I show the transition of the Japanese 
perspectives about America and its people since the 
establishment of the company three years ago. The third 
chapter describes the first phase of MTI from January 1989 
to December of the same year when the Japanese gave priority
to establishing a community model within the office. The
fourth chapter describes the following year, January 1990 to 
December 1990, when events that undermined the concept of
5the community model took place. The fifth chapter traces 
the company from January 1991 to the present during which 
time when the Japanese lost interest in the community model 
and a duality between the Japanese and Americans emerged.
The final chapter contains a more open-ended analysis rather 
than a conclusive statement because the company's future 
operations are likely to continue to alter the Japanese view 
of America. I hope this case study will contribute to a 
better working relationship between the Japanese 
businesspeople in the Untied States and Americans employed 
by Japanese companies. I
V\v*~ vv-yV?
JT
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Chapter II 
Portrait: Metric Tools International
II.I. The City:
1
Metric Tools International, Inc. (MTI) is located in a 
rural midwestern city of approximately 30,000 people. The 
city has eight industrial parks, although dairy farms and
corn fields surround its border. In fact, the city enjoys 
16 industries that hire more than 150 employees each, 
distinguishing itself as one of the major industrial areas 
in the state. Two of the largest industries hire a total of 
more than 9,000 employees, attracting many workers from 
outside the city. As a result, an estimated 51% of the 
local population are blue collar workers.
In the 1980s, the city's two largest industries
suffered a considerable decline in their business, resulting
in a large number of layoffs. However, due to the efforts
of city officials, the area has succeeded in luring 17 
foreign corporations to establish their plants and offices 
in order to provide alternative jobs for displaced workers. 
Nine of the 17 corporations are Japanese (three distributors 
and six manufacturers), hiring a total of more than 1,100
6
7employees. As the number of Japanese companies increases in
the city, the Japanese population grows in proportion. The
more than 300 Japanese people in the city qualifies them as 
one of the largest minority groups in an area where 98% of 
the population is white. The relationship between the 
Japanese and Americans has been generally amicable, 
according to the Japanese executives, their wives, and local 
city officials. However, some cases of racial harassment in 
the form of threatening phone calls have been reported.
Several factors influenced MTI to locate itself in this 
city. First, a Japanese transplant that would become MTI's 
largest customer was located in the area (the transplant's 
parent company in Japan has a very close tie with MTI's 
parent company). Second, a number of Japanese manufacturers 
that might require the service MTI could offer had their 
transplants in the region. Already, approximately 100 
Japanese companies existed within the state. Lastly, as 
noted above, the local city officials campaigned to attract 
Japanese companies in order to better the area's sagging 
economy.
II. II. The Company:
MTI was incorporated as a joint-venture business in 
January of 1989 with three parent companies sharing its 
stock. Kogu Corporation, one of the largest tool
8distributors in Japan, holds a 60% share of the stock. For 
Kogu, which enjoys an annual sales exceeding $170 million in \
 ^p O 'jr ^
Japan, MTI was its first international office to be ' J
2 fti 9 ^ l"H.
established. Another 30% share comes from Boeki
Corporation, a Japanese trading firm (sogo shosha), and the
rema-ining 10% is owned by its American subsidiary, Boeki
America, Inc. In contrast with Kogu, Boeki has over 150
overseas offices, and its annual revenue exceeds $105
billion. Boeki America, headquartered in New York City,
boasts sales of over $17 billion a year, making the company
3one of the largest exporters m  the United States.
The parent companies established MTI in the United
States in response to the growing needs among the Japanese
transplants for metric-size tools and "just-in-time" ^
4 . .
service. The joint venture successfully wedded Kogu’s
extensive knowledge in "just-in-time" service of precision 
tools in Japan with Boeki and Boeki America's comprehensive 
network of information about the transplants in the United 
States that might require Japanese services and metric-size 
tools.
In addition to the "just-in-time" service, MTI strongly 
encourages a face-to-face business that includes daily 
contacts with customers. The management repeatedly 
emphasizes the quality of service based on the Japanese 
method of establishing personal relationships with
V")
‘irn>7
9customers. MTI sells primarily to Japanese transplants
within 100 miles of the company. However, MTI is
aggressively developing its customers to the east and south
of the state. Several important customers are located as
far away as North Carolina. Due to the continuing
expansion of its business, the company has been successfully
5producing a profit every year since its establishment.
6
II.III. The People:
Three Japanese men and six local men and women are 
currently working at MTI. The management consists of only 
the Japanese men. Since the president resides in Japan and 
only visits the company a few times a year, Takeo "Tom" 
Yamano, the Executive Vice President, is largely in charge 
of the company. Now in his early forties and a graduate of 
a prestigious private university in Japan, Yamano has been 
working for Boeki for almost twenty years. Because he has 
had extensive overseas business experience not only in the 
United States but also in Europe, the Middle East, and 
Northern Africa, he speaks English comfortably. However, 
the assignment in the United States is his first long-term 
international mission. He has been in the United States for 
five years, including three years at MTI. Yamano is affable 
and energetic in his private life. He is simultaneously 
cautious and aggressive in business. At MTI, the American
10
staff members favor him for his friendliness: they call him 
"Tom," and under his influence, the Americans refer to all 
the Japanese by their English names.
The two other Japanese are Vice President (and also the 
Sales Manager), Yoshihiro "Josh” Takenaka, and supervisor in 
sales, Joji "George" Sonoda. Takenaka and Sonoda, both in 
their early thirties, graduated from regional colleges in 
western Japan and have been working for Kogu since their 
graduation. In Japan, Takenaka has been on the fastest 
promotion track to become a branch manager at the age of 
thirty-two. He is aggressive and at times emotional. He 
also takes good care of his Japanese subordinates by 
inviting them to his home when Kogu sends them to MTI. On 
the other hand, Sonoda, originally a salesperson at Kogu, is 
more subdued than the other two. However, he has such 
extensive knowledge about tools and machinery that not only 
the American staff but also Yamano and Takenaka rely upon 
him. Neither Takenaka nor Sonoda had previous business 
experience abroad, nor did they have a sufficient command of 
English to conduct business in the United States. However, 
their English has improved considerably in the past three 
years— enough to make the American staff insist that "there 
is no language problem anymore" at MTI.
The adjustment of Yamano, Takenaka, and Sonoda to the 
United States— people and business— will be discussed in
11
detail in later chapters. It should he noted that their 
adjustment to the life outside of business has been 
reasonably smooth. Their children and wives are enjoying 
new lives in the foreign land, although with some 
difficulties. After five to seven years at MTI, the parent 
companies will recall the Japanese at MTI and replace them 
by other Japanese managers.
The local American staff consists of three males and 
three females. Two of the men, Scott Smith and Carl 
Fischer, are salespeople, while the other man, Randy Brown, 
and three women, Marge Bird, Emily Baker, and Jen Heart, are 
engaged in general administrative and secretarial work in 
the office. Scott and Marge, now in their forties, have 
widely diverse job experience. Marge, who has been engaged 
in secretarial jobs most of her career, is a meticulous 
planner. Scott, who lived in Japan for two years after 
completing an undergraduate degree in business, is the only 
person at MTI with previous exposure to Japanese culture and 
with the ability to speak Japanese. Emily, the only 
non-native of the state, is in her late twenties. She quit 
college one year short of completing her B .A. degree in 
business and was working as a secretary before MTI hired 
her. The other three are in their early twenties. Jen is 
trying to complete her accounting degree at a local 
vocational school. Carl and Randy, both graduates of local
12
high schools, have little or no previous job experience. In 
addition to the nine members mentioned above, at least one 
Japanese from one of the parent companies is always helping 
to ease the heavy workload at MTI. Thus, in total, about 
ten people work in the office.
At MTI, none of the local staff has been fired. The 
American staff members generally favor the management. Most 
of them have no intention of quitting in the future.
Rather, a few have expressed their wishes to work at MTI 
"until retirement." Consequently, the turn-over has been 
low: in the past three years, only one man has quit for a 
personal reason.
II.IV. A Typical Day at MTI:
A typical day begins at nine o'clock at MTI. Unlike
its parent companies in Japan, no formal ceremony marks th<
beginning of the day. Rather, a rush of phone calls from 
the customers acts as a bell indicating the opening of a new 
day. Once the day begins, people in the office have little 
time to relax: they frequently receive phone calls and 
visitors and make a number of necessary calls. About half 
of the phone calls are from the Japanese engineers, while 
the other half are from American purchase agents and 
suppliers.
A day at MTI passes by quickly (despite a one-hour
lunch break); at 5:00 p.m., the Americans leave the office. 
Though the Japanese usually do not leave at 5:00 p.m., the 
atmosphere of the office becomes far more relaxed after the 
Americans leave. The workload remains heavy, but the 
Japanese in the office begin chatting and joking in 
Japanese. They can make all the phone calls in their native 
language, now that only the Japanese remain at the customer 
plants. After 6:00 p.m. when the office in Japan begins its 
day (8:00 a.m. Japan time), the Japanese are usually busy 
again obtaining information from Japan about necessary 
products. At the same time, they engage in personal 
conversation with their friends at parent companies, topics 
of which range from complaints about American staff to 
personal gossip to the results of professional baseball 
games in Japan. Not until after 8:00 p.m. do the Japanese 
start going home. It is not at all unusual to see them 
working until midnight.
II.V. Methodology:
For one year, I worked with the Japanese and American
people at MTI. My encounter with MTI came about more by 
chance than by a deliberate choice. I was hired in April 
1989, through a connection with Yamano, whom I knew from my 
college years. He needed someone who knew both English and 
Japanese to work for a tool distributor that was just being
14
established; he was going to assume the position of 
Executive Vice President of the new company. I accepted his 
offer and agreed to work for one year.
My access to a number of important documents that I 
translated into Japanese or English enabled me to learn 
quickly about the business as well as the history of MTI. 
Moreover, not only did I engage in
interpretation/translation, but also I was involved in ^  
sales, import and export, and accounting. This variety of 
tasks allowed me to develop an in depth understanding of the 
comprehensive business operation at MTI. The small size of 
the company allowed me to have a wide range of 
responsibilities. Moreover, the size of the company was 
instrumental in my nurturing a close relationship with 
Americans and, especially, with the other Japanese in the 
office. I worked hard; rarely, if ever, did I leave the 
office at five o'clock. As a result, people at MTI accepted 
me as an "insider." I went on business trips with my 
superiors. They entrusted me with some important telephone 
calls to represent MTI. I had my company jacket, cap, and 
namecard. Occasionally, the Japanese even asked my 
opinions, as a member of MTI, to make decisions. And after 
a long day of work, my Japanese superiors often invited me 
for dinner at their homes, and we talked until late into the 
night over drinks.
15
At the same time, however, a realization that my 
contract lasted for only a year limited my empathy with the y 
company; I was not a permanent insider at MTI. Neither did y 
I belong to any of the parent companies. Naturally, I could \ Vrv~'w -^< 
not share the corporate alliances the other Japanese in the / 
office had. This realization enabled me to step back and 
view the company from a more detached, outsider*s 
perspective. In this way, my position allowed me to view 
the company from inside with an outsider's 
perspective— being an "observant-participator." 5
This "observant-participator" status lasted from April
1989 until April 1990 (from the middle of phase one through 
two). I collected the information about MTI prior to my
arrival through interviews, brochures, and documents
available at the office. As for the period after my
departure, I returned to MTI three times for a total of 12
days. During those times, I again sat in the office to
observe the differences from and similarities to the time__I 
worked at MTI. I also conducted a series of interviews with 
all the personnel. I had interviews with the American staff 
members during office hours in a conference room. Thanks to 
Yamano, who encouraged the Americans to express their candid 
opinions to me by assuring the confidentiality of their 
responses, I believe I could obtain reasonably honest 
viewpoints. Each interview lasted for forty-five minutes to
16
one hour. I interviewed some employees as many as three 
times. The Japanese were willing J:jo_be^ i.njter-vi-ewed—both. in 
the, office during the weekdays and at their homes during the 
weekends. Each interview lasted more than one arid a half to 
two hours. I interviewed all three Japanese, Yamano,
Takenaka and Sonoda, three times. In addition, in order to 
have some reference points, I interviewed several other 
people outside of MTI, such as a director at the local 
Chamber of Commerce, a Japanese executive of another local 
Japanese manufacturing company, and the wives of Japanese 
businessmen in the city. Only a few interviews were tape 
recorded because I feared the presence of the recorder might 
prevent candid answers. Therefore, although I took 
extensive notes to retain as much information as possible, 
the words transcribed in this paper were not recorded 
verbatim. In addition, since all the interviews with the 
Japanese were conducted in Japanese, they have been
translated into English.
Chapter III 
Phase One
The 500-square-foot temporary MTI office was crowded 1
\ 'X—“vCV
with four Japanese and two Americans, piles of tool \
catalogs, fax and telex machines, a copier, and six desks 
upon which the people stacked purchase orders, invoices, 
quotations, and telephone memos. All but two desks faced 
the same direction towards a large window at the front.
Yamano, E.V.P., sat at the corner of the office facing the 
back of Takenaka, V.P., who faced the back of Scott, a 
salesperson. Marge sat across from Scott, also facing the 
window. The two Japanese, Sonoda and I, however, sat at the 
back of the office facing each other (Figure 1).
MTI's office style was unusual because it fit neither H  
of the characteristic American or Japanese styles. It \
differed from the usual American layout where managers often 
enjoyed the privilege of retreating to their own offices 
while the staff members enjoyed privacy by having partitions 
surrounding their desks. It also differed from the usual 
open office style of Japanese companies, where people faced 
each other, and the manager sat at the top end of the line
17
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Figure 1: Temporary Office
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of desks (Yoshino 1986: 176, Nevins 1988: 128). The 
Japanese at MTI had come from an environment in which they 
faced their colleagues across their desks while they could 
bump those sitting next to them with their elbows.
At MTI, the four people looking towards the window had 
no one facing or sitting beside them. Unless they attempted 
to peer at others' desks, they could not tell what their 
colleagues were doing. No partitions existed, but the order 
of the desks created an invisible partition that provided 
people with privacy. At the same time, however, absence of 
partitions allowed people to easily see and hear even the 
small incidents that took place in the office. Not only was 
this lack of visible boundaries important for the Japanese 
managers to supervise the American staff, but it was also 
necessary to enhance a sense of camaraderie between the two 
groups by facilitating better communication: one only needed 
to turn around to get some assistance or share information. 
Meanwhile, Sonoda and I sat in the back facing each other, 
in a purely Japanese style. Neither of us disliked this 
arrangement, nor regarded it as strange, although Marge once 
commented she would not like her desk facing someone else's.
The office layout at MTI presented a hybrid of commonly 
observed Japanese and American systems with an emphasis on 
the Japanese style: it retained the open office style 
without partitions as well as some desks facing each other,
20
thus suggesting the influence of the all-Japanese 
management. Significantly, even from the beginning, the 
Japanese management had altered the basic physical structure 
of the Japanese open office style to allow for a wider 
physical distance between the individuals in the office.
However, this initial alteration of the typical 
Japanese style appeared not so much as a result of the 
management's conscious effort to distance itself from the 
American employees as a simple copy of the style practiced 
at the headquarters of Boeki America. Far from creating an 
emotional and social gap between the Japanese and Americans, 
the management at MTI took the utmost care to create a 
harmonious relationship by establishing a sense of community 
or "family," as the management and staff called it, within 
the office. The Japanese firmly believed that MTI could not 
succeed without cooperation. Yamano, who used to be 
involved in plant exports, said from his personal 
experience, "No one person could win a contract for building 
a $100 million factory. We [at Boeki] needed a collective 
effort." For him, the tool and machinery business did not 
differ in that sense. Takenaka, originally a salesman at 
Kogu, convinced Scott of the impracticality of commission as 
a part of the wage system by showing how many people took 
part in one sale at MTI: Scott sold, Sonoda provided him 
with supplier information, and I issued an invoice to
21
collect the money. in short, the management emphasized and 
valued collaboration, rather than competition.
Encouraged by this kind of atmosphere, Marge 
occasionally bought doughnuts at the company*s expense which 
all the members enjoyed with free drinks. The Japanese and 
Americans jocundly teased each other about "getting fat" 
from eating the sweets. Sonoda and Scott made road trips 
for sales calls, and Scott, a native of the state, often 
took Sonoda through the back roads to show him the rural 
country scenes of the American midwest. Moreover, the 
management attentively listened to the opinions of the 
American staff members. Many times they praised the 
management for its "accessibility" and "not yelling" even 
when the staff made mistakes. The Japanese suppressed their 
occasional resentments when the Americans did not match 
their expectations in order to nurture a close "family" 
relationship in the office.
The Japanese at MTI kept the tie among themselves even 
stronger than their tie with the Americans. Takenaka and I 
often played catch behind the office building. Several 
times, the Japanese left the office at five o*clock to play 
a half round of golf together (though they usually returned 
to work after sunset). After a long day of work, just like 
they used to do in Japan, the Japanese at MTI often ate and 
drank together to relieve the stress from the work and
22
engage in a relaxed conversation at one of the managers' 
homes.
The decision-making process of the Japanese revealed 
the harmony even more strikingly. Although the Japanese 
managers heeded and incorporated the American staff members' 
opinions, the management held the occasional managerial 
meetings after the staff left at 5:00 p.m. The Japanese at 
MTI reached decisions consensually and cooperatively with a 
strong team spirit. They had active discussions, but they 
rarely, if ever, disagreed with each other strongly. Not 
only did the Japanese seek consensus among themselves, but 
also they considered a consensus with the parent companies 
crucial. The parent companies cast a strong influence upon 
MTI; never a weekday passed without the Japanese at MTI 
calling or faxing to Kogu or Boeki in order to exchange 
information with their colleagues and superiors.
This emphasis on "family" was a straightforward 
importation of a Japanese cultural assumption to the United 
States. Research supports that the Japanese companies 
prefer cooperation to competition within the company 
(Pascale & Athos 1981: 119). Typically, management regards 
the corporate organization and its employees as a community 
or a family in which people share common organizational 
goals and cultural values (Morita 1986: 130). Therefore, 
the management's main concern is to maintain the group's
23
harmony (Pascal & Athos 1981: 126). Thus the management 
gives meticulous attention to individuals to ensure their 
well-being; each individual is the basis of the company as a 
community model. The creation of the "family" atmosphere at 
MTI was a case in which the Japanese consciously attempted 
to implant their cultural assumption in American soil.
While the transplantation of the Japanese assumption 
about valuing "family" was quite successful at MTI, another 
assumption the management attempted to apply was less so.
In Japan, the relationship between the customer and supplier 
is closely intertwined in such a way that makes them 
dependent upon each other. It creates a solid production 
chain in which a customer and supplier both work closely on 
various issues such as the quick and efficient delivery 
system of Just-In-Time. Through close and long 
relationships that often include the holding of one 
another’s stock, companies "develop a sense of shared 
destiny" (Dertouzos 1989: 181).
MTI completely failed to develop a sense of "shared 
destiny" with its American suppliers, despite its attempt to 
establish relationships with them. The contacts with 
American suppliers to request quotations turned out to be 
difficult, not so much because of the language problem 
(Scott called often), but because of the prevalence of what 
the Japanese called "double-tongued" suppliers. Often the
24
Japanese managers found a discrepancy between the actual 
price and the quoted price. Worse, the routine discrepancy 
between the actual delivery date and quoted date turned out 
to be disastrous and embarrassing for MTI, as the gap in 
turn delayed the company's delivery to customers and 
betrayed the "just-in-time" motto. Long delivery time often 
unexpectedly forced MTI to resort to an expensive way of 
importing goods from its parent company in Japan.
This lesson resulted in a feeling among the Japanese
to "Never trust American suppliers." Scott shared this
feeling because he made a number of contacts on behalf of
the Japanese for quotations or order status. A phrase,
"because they are Americans [they lie]," became common in
the office to describe the failures of American suppliers.
The Japanese pointed out every mistake among themselves in
the office with the remark, "Are you an American?" which was
an insult for them. When the American suppliers did perform
well, they shared surprised feelings such as, "They do well
for Americans!" The failure of American suppliers to
satisfy the Japanese contributed to the formation of a sense
of superiority to American business, a sense they had only
1
heard and read about while they lived in Japan.
While the Japanese scoffed at American suppliers for 
their inefficiency, they prided themselves in sharing a 
sense of "destiny" with their customers that enabled them to
25
provide the best services. Such services included quick 
delivery— a delivery even before the issuance of a formal 
purchase order. Requests for tools and machinery at 
customer plants were usually given to MTI salespeople by the 
Japanese supervising engineers who would then turn in their 
acquisition requests to the purchasing department. However, 
because of the extensive time required to process paperwork, 
the customers provided MTI with a written purchase order and 
its number only after a considerable lapse of time. Since 
the Japanese engineers wanted the goods as soon as possible, 
the Japanese at MTI opted to supply the requested goods, 
even without a purchase order number, to abide by their 
motto, "just-in-time," and to satisfy their Japanese 
customers. After all, Kogu's customers accepted such a 
practice in Japan.
However, this service boasted by the Japanese triggered 
a major controversy that ultimately forced them to drop 
their "flexibility." The purchasing and receiving 
departments, which consisted of American managers and staff, 
would not accept any goods without a purchase order number. 
MTI's ignoring of their policy created such considerable 
confusion among the American-managed accounts payable office 
at the customer plants that they threatened to refuse all 
payments and to sever their relationship with MTI.
At this moment, MTI could do nothing but to observe the
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instructions given by the Americans. No matter how 
customer-oriented MTI might have been, no money meant no 
business. Its policy not to deliver without a proper 
purchase order number outraged the Japanese engineers (who 
had nothing to do with the American-managed accounting 
office) at the transplants. MTI*s Japanese managers and the 
engineers held a number of meetings in which the latter 
accused the former of "Americanizing," just like the 
Japanese management at MTI accused its American suppliers' 
lack of service spirit. Even though the "American" way 
could mean a delay in the delivery, the very betrayal of 
their proud motto of "just-in-time," MTI had to stand firm 
on adhering to the "American" way because its implementation 
could affect the survival of the company.
Thus, in the first year of its operation the Japanese 
management at MTI adhered to cultural assumptions they had 
brought from Japan. Some assumptions seemed to apply 
equally well in the United States as they did in Japan. The 
most notable was the value of "family" atmosphere that made, 
as Yamano said, "people want to come to the office every 
morning." Even though the management arranged a wider 
physical distance than its Japanese counterparts, emotional 
and social distance among not only the Japanese but also the 
American staff remained close. On the other hand, the 
Japanese found out that not all Japanese assumptions fit
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well in the United States. Business based on the 
tight-knit, "destiny sharing" production chain was 
impossible in the United States because the suppliers could 
not cooperate with the concept of "just-in-time" service and 
customers required an indication of contractual agreement 
for every business transaction. The Japanese management 
felt frustrated with the difference. The Japanese managers 
depressurized their frustration with suppliers by routinely 
degrading them verbally in their conversation and confirming 
their own superiority. However, the problem with the 
customers provided them with no option but to adapt to the 
system in the United States in order for their business to 
survive.
Chapter IV 
Phase Two
On a freezing day in December of 1989, while the 
American staff members were enjoying their holiday break, 
eight Japanese men sent by Kogu transferred everything from 
the crowded temporary office to a brand new 
14,OOO-square-foot building that was just completed in an 
industrial park, about six miles away. The new building had 
an office space of 4,OOO-square-feet with the remainder of 
the space serving as a warehouse. In anticipation of a 
future increase in personnel, the management at MTI decided 
to purchase six additional desks to bring the total number 
of desks in the new office to twelve.
The Japanese at MTI laid out the office arrangement in 
advance using a cardboard model. They decided that the 
open-style office would be continued; only the president's 
office was kept separate. The president's room was a 
luxurious space with a plush carpet, a $1,600 oak desk, a 
fancy clock, and two large windows, but it remained 
unoccupied. This room stood as a constant reminder that the 
president of MTI lived in Japan: he was, first, the
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president of Kogu, then he was the president of MTI. In ,
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other words, he who lived in Japan had the final control of  ^
the company
Neither Yamanaka or Takenaka had any intention of a --^ ~<^^ u.^
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retreating into their personal offices. They insisted on
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remaining in the open-style office because they were used to
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such an environment in Japan, after having worked over 19
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and 10 years respectively for the parent companies. For
•  •  •  •  o v - *- ) ^  \jthem, a personal office did not symbolize prestige, but v
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isolation, loneliness, and lack of supervision of others in u
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the office. A personal office prevented developing a L ^
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camaraderie which they believed was essential to the 4." ^
"family" atmosphere. In a sense, the Japanese at MTI
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preferred to have a relationship that was not "'dry', cool,
and calculated, but 'wet' with human emotion" (Vogel 1979: •* •*...*
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Yamano instructed me to make a model of the office - ' ^
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according to some criteria he had defined. First, everyone
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would be in the same room except for the receptionist. .
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Second, additional file cabinets would be given to everyone, 
thus providing each with a spacious work area of a 2*1” x 5' ?
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desk and a 4*2” x 1’ L-shape attachment. Yamano wanted /to-
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make the best use of the large office space; therefore,
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people were not to sit facing each other. The office layout Kj
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provided everyone with her/his corner encompassed by a — - 1
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vertical attachment, a desk, an aisle, and a desk behind. 
Carefully, I created an office plan (Figure 2).
The arrangement of the non-facing desk order was a 
continuation of the previous office style. This time, 
however, the style became consistent: no one faced each 
other at all. The Japanese management completed the 
revision of its assumption on the physical structure of the 
office by providing a small alcove that gave everyone a 
greater space to work. Unlike the Japanese style, in which 
the managers have bigger desks, the area at MTI was large 
enough to allow the same amount of space for everyone. 
Consequently, the Japanese and Americans had more privacy 
than in a typical office style in which people could catch a 
glimpse of what others had in their drawers.
At the same time, however, a strong Japanese influence 
prevailed. The supervision remained strong. Since Yamano 
wanted to sit at a desk from which he could oversee the 
entire operation, he sat at the lower-left hand corner. 
Takenaka wanted to sandwich Scott in between himself and 
Sonoda in order to "watch" what Scott did in sales. In 
addition, Takenaka implemented a policy practiced in the 
parent company which required people to clean off their 
desks completely everyday before they left? they had to go 
through everything on their desks in order to remind 
themselves how much work remained. Above all, management at
Entrance Jen
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Unoccupied RandyEmily
Carl Hayashi Sonoda
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Figure 2: New Office (Arrangement as of April, 1991)
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MTI not only refused personal office space but also 
partitions. The absence of partitions continued to 
facilitate occasional casual conversations and jokes which 
brought laughter and, importantly, a sense of friendship, or 
"family," in a tangible way.
Even with greater physical distance among employees, 
the sense of family remained strong, thanks to the conscious 
efforts not only by the Japanese but also by the American 
staff. By helping the Japanese managers in a strange land, 
Marge and Scott developed a feeling that they "helped to set 
up MTI." "MTI is part of me," said Marge.
Curiously, MTI*s new location in an industrial park 
helped nurture a further sense of a cozy "family" 
atmosphere. After the move, the Japanese did not have 
enough time to drive into town to have lunch like they often 
did in the temporary office. Consequently, people at MTI 
started eating together in the kitchen. One person, either 
a young Japanese helper from Kogu or I, would take an order 
and go purchase lunch for everyone. Then people sat around 
a small dining table and had Wendy's hamburgers, chili, and 
fries. On other occasions, the Japanese brought in and 
cooked rice and noodles ("udon") in the kitchen. When 
Japanese noodles were made, Marge and Scott willingly tried 
them, much to the amazement and excitement of the Japanese.
Eating is a curious habit; it binds people. In Japan,
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the Japanese go out to eat and drink together after work to 
share their feelings, opinions, and reinforce their ties as 
members of the same corporate organization as well as to 
heal the "on-the-job psychic injuries" (Pascal & Athos 1981: 
127). This relaxed socialization functions as a 
"safety-valve in the Japanese management" to depressurize 
the need for competition and individualism (Chang 1982: 87). 
True, lunch at MTI differed from after-work eating and 
drinking; no one drank alcohol, and language always caused a 
problem when it came to topics unrelated to tools and 
machinery. Nevertheless, the simple act of eating lunch 
together enhanced the sense of MTI as one "family" entity 
where "everyone liked each other."
Between the kitchen and office at MTI, there was a 
space called "computer corner." The move to the new office 
initiated the full implementation of a computer system at 
MTI. The introduction of a computer system resulted from a 
careful decision by the management, despite an unusual 
opposition expressed by some members of Boeki in Japan.
Those who expressed strong hesitation to computerization 
reasoned that the time was "premature" to make such a major 
investment. However, the management at MTI finally 
convinced them by indicating that "the majority of 
respectable companies in America" were computerized. As a 
result, MTI purchased a networked computer system with three 
stations.
34
Unexpectedly for the management, this introduction of 
new technology posed a challenging operational problem to 
the Japanese. For the first time it became necessary to 
make clear distinctions between individual job 
responsibilities in order to assure the input of accurate 
information to the computer. Information had to be keyed in 
collectively and systematically in order to avoid duplicate 
or loss of information. For example, someone had to become 
exclusively responsible for keying in information about the 
receipts of goods while another had to be responsible for 
the receipts of invoices. In addition, it was necessary to 
have someone oversee the entire operation to ensure the 
accuracy of information before it was posted everyday.
At this moment, MTI had only seven people; it was 
impossible to have a purchasing department, a receiving 
department, an accounting department, etc. Yamano had 
stressed that in a small operation like MTI, "things had to 
be worked at collectively and responsibly." True, there had 
been some distinct divisions of labor. For example, Marge 
oversaw expenses, and I took care of all the translation and 
interpretation jobs. Overall, the distinctions among the 
individuals' jobs had been blurred. With the beginning of 
full operation of the computer system, however, the Japanese 
mangers made the distinctions, for the first time, that I 
would be in charge of the receiving, Marge would issue the
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checks, and the helper from Japan, Matsuda, would take care 
of purchase orders.
The emergence of these distinctions in jobs challenged 
cultural assumptions held by the Japanese at MTI. Clear 
"job description" does not exist in Japan. Although 
companies in Japan have a formal structure based on the 
specialty of each section (in the case of Boeki, based on 
the geography and products), each individuals job under the 
section chief is hardly defined (Yoshino 1986: 106). If 
Japanese companies provide written job descriptions at all, 
they give them to the section, and only in an extremely 
broad way (Yoshino 1986: 113). Within the section, 
therefore, people are generalists who are capable of 
managing a variety of tasks. The Japanese companies prefer 
such generalists to specialists (Morita 1986: 184). 
Naturally, as seen in phase one, the Japanese at MTI had 
long resisted the idea of job descriptions by pointing out 
that no one job could be completed by one specialist; hence, 
a clear-cut job definition was not feasible and was 
unnecessary.
Nevertheless, in response to the introduction of a 
computer system, the task of creating job descriptions 
appeared unavoidable. Although at this stage the Japanese 
managers at MTI made informal, verbal distinctions ("Can you 
do this?"; "I think so."), they felt that more comprehensive
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job descriptions might be necessary in the future as the 
volume in business expanded.
During the second year, the effort by the Japanese at 
MTI to retain their cultural value of "family" continued.
As a result, they maintained a close social and emotional 
relationship with each other. However, the introduction of 
a computer system and the subsequent emergence of job 
descriptions portended the widening of such distances by the 
creation of boundaries of responsibility around each 
individual. Despite a strong faith in the maintenance of a 
"family" atmosphere, the proximity of emotional and social 
distance would soon start coming apart in proportion to the 
wider physical distance of the new office. At that time, 
the Japanese at MTI were left with a deep sense of 
frustration because they were at a loss how to efficiently 
and effectively delegate the responsibilities to the staff. 
That is, coming from a culture where "job descriptions" did 
not exist, they could not provide proper job descriptions 
for their American staff members.
The sense of frustration over the difficulty in 
providing job descriptions continued to accumulate until it 
brought an outburst of emotion. The specific incident 
signaling the extent of the frustration occurred during the 
physical inventory count at the end of the second year, on 
December 22, 1990, almost a year after MTI had moved into 
the new building.
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On that cold winter day, the lights at MTI were turned 
on at 6:45 a.m. By 7:00 a.m., two hours before regular 
office hours, all the Japanese and Americans were present. 
Normal operation had been shut down the day before, and the 
22nd, the last business day of the year for MTI, was 
reserved for the warehouse inventory count.
MTI had an inventory of $800,000 with over 1,000 
different items ranging from drill blades to rulers to 
industrial brushes. Despite the early start, the Japanese 
managers had predicted that the counting would not be 
finished until after sunset. Yamano and Takenaka "ordered" 
the staff to abide by Muto's instructions for that day's 
work. (Muto was a temporary helper from Japan who was about 
to return after a three-month mission.) He assigned 
everyone a section to count and the work began in the chilly 
warehouse.
Sometime between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m., Marge decided to 
go to the kitchen to have a cup of coffee. Almost at the 
same time, Scott left the warehouse to get a can of soda. 
Meanwhile, telephones rang frequently in the office with 
calls from several Japanese plants that were still in 
operation on that day. Sonoda, Muto, and Yamano left the 
warehouse to take the calls. Since some people had called 
for Scott, Emily, who was taking the phone calls that day,
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left the office to hand him the messages and found both 
Marge and him in the kitchen. They started to chat, just as 
they often did on other days.
Jen had just started working for MTI to alleviate the 
heavy workload of Marge and Emily. Not familiar with the 
procedure of counting, she asked Takenaka a question. Not 
knowing the others had left the warehouse and wondering why 
she came all the way to ask him a question, Takenaka asked, 
"Why don't you ask your partner [Marge]?" Jen replied, 
innocently, "Oh, I think she's taking a break."
Takenaka looked around him, only to realize that he and 
Jen were the only people in the chilly warehouse struggling 
with counting the tools. He immediately went to the main 
building where he spotted the three American staff members 
in the kitchen. But first, he approached Muto, who had just 
been on the phone, and asked, "Did you tell them to take a 
break?" "No," said Muto. Then Takenaka turned around and 
strode into the kitchen. He was infuriated. For the first 
time in the two years since he had come to MTI, he yelled: 
"WHO SAID YOU CAN TAKE BREAK! GO BACK TO WAREHOUSE!"
A moment of silence prevailed. Scott, Marge, and Emily 
stood stunned. They had never been yelled at, even when 
they had committed disastrous mistakes (such as Scott having 
$1,500 in tools stolen from the unlocked delivery vehicle). 
Yamano came running from the office to find out what had
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happened. Finally, Scott mumbled in Japanese, "I’m sorry." 
Then he returned to the warehouse. In his mind, however, he 
angrily thought, "He didn't have to yell! If this is that 
important of a job, he should have told us!" Marge felt 
furious. Although she refrained from talking back, in her 
mind she repeated, "This wasn't really a break! Don't we 
always come in to the kitchen for coffee? He had no right 
to yell!" She later refused to take a break when Muto 
formally declared one. Emily was more astonished than 
angry. She had thought that Japanese people never yell 
since they disliked conflict.
The interesting aspect of this incident is how the 
Japanese and Americans perceived the reason for Takenaka's 
sudden and uncommon outburst of anger. The American staff 
members seemed oblivious to the instruction given by the 
management to follow Muto's orders. In the later 
interviews, they never mentioned about their responsibility 
to abide by Muto's orders on that day. Rather, they 
attributed the incident to an aberration, based on a 
particular mood of Takenaka on that day. "He must have 
gotten up on the wrong side of the bed," they said. The 
staff members felt the anger was not their fault, and 
instead blamed Takenaka's caprice.
On the other hand, in Japan any strong expression of
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one's emotion in an office is a rarity. Rohlen, in his 
study of a Japanese Bank, found that "an outburst of 
anger... receives immediate notice and often leads to 
interpersonal problems that take a long time to resolve" 
(1974: 97). Such problems are nothing but detrimental for 
the Japanese, whose primary interest is to keep a sense of 
harmony ("family") within any organization. Thus,
Takenaka's anger cannot be attributed to a simple mood. 
Rather, Takenaka and the other Japanese at MTI justified his 
outrage by claiming that the Americans failed to follow the 
instruction given by the management to follow Muto's orders 
on that day. Takenaka became infuriated not so much because 
the Americans took a respite from work, but because the 
Americans neglected the order to follow Muto's instructions. 
The anger over the staff members' negligence to perform the 
assignment was combined with the pressure to complete the 
long and tedious physical inventory count within one day 
until the frustration could not have been repressed anymore.
This incident represents a crisis of appropriate 
leadership by the Japanese management. The management 
lacked an effective strategy for communicating with the 
American staff about even a simple assignment for a day's 
activity, let alone any job descriptions that covered the 
staff's everyday activity.
Chapter V 
Phase Three
The Japanese at MTI never discussed the unpleasant 
December incident. Nevertheless, they sensed the necessity 
of "job descriptions." Since they had no experience in 
writing job descriptions, Yamano came up with the novel idea 
of asking the staff members to define their own job 
descriptions.
The result was a two-page "Position Description 
Questionnaire," that Yamano made during the long holiday 
vacation after the December incident. On the first page, he 
defined the purpose of this questionnaire as "to assign a 
proper [i.e. particular] person to a proper job and 
responsibility." Then he asked three questions. In the 
first question, "Position Responsibilities Summary," he 
asked the staff members to "describe the basic function(s) 
or purpose" of their positions. Next he requested them to 
describe their "Principal Duties" in the order of 
importance. The last question asked them to "identify" 
their "knowledge and skills" that may be useful for their 
jobs at MTI.
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The questionnaire was a strange, if not bizarre, 
approach to provide the staff with clear job descriptions: 
Why should the management ask the staff to define their 
responsibilities?, Why should the management, after hiring 
the staff, feel the need to assign them to "proper" jobs? 
This approach taken by Yamano inverted the normal hiring 
procedure in the United States in which the employers hire 
people to fill in the open "slots." It reflected a 
confusion of the Japanese management in their attempt to 
create job descriptions, something "American" they had never 
seen or made, which had not been given to the staff members 
upon their employment.
The Japanese assumption that ambiguous job descriptions 
for each individual would maintain a generalist attitude was 
deeply ingrained in the managers' minds. Therefore, they 
failed to provide any concrete job descriptions by utilizing 
the questionnaire, much to the disappointment of the 
American staff members who responded to the questionnaire 
hoping to have their jobs defined clearly. "I don't know 
what happened, but it must have drifted away," shrugged 
Emily, while Yamano quietly confessed, "It is so difficult 
to accommodate what they want to do."
Soon after giving out the questionnaire, the Japanese 
decided to hire two more men, Randy and Carl. Because the 
Japanese and Scott sold aggressively, this addition came
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concomitant with a continued increase in MTI's business 
volume. The management hired Randy and Carl because they 
were both young and inexperienced. Like its parent 
companies in Japan, MTI preferred someone whom it could mold 
over someone who had had considerable experience in other 
American companies. In the same month, Kogu sent another 
Japanese man, Hayashi, to replace Muto. Unlike Muto, 
Hayshi's mission was potentially long-term because he was to 
become a manager of sales administration (if he could obtain 
a working visa). The work volume of sales administration 
had been increasing dramatically at MTI without direction 
from any experienced Japanese manager.
Ironically, the increase in the number of personnel did 
not lighten the burden of others. Rather, their presence 
created further confusion among the American staff members 
because of the lack of individual job description and 
training. The management "experimentally" assigned Carl to 
sales and Randy to sales administrative work, after hiring 
them without "job descriptions." However, their assignments 
did not go beyond these generic categories. Consequently, 
to the eyes of the other Americans, Randy and Carl "were 
thrown in without explanation or overseeing" of their jobs.
The older staff members believed that because of Randy and 
Carl's age and lack of experience, the management should 
give the two more detailed instructions about their jobs.
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Scott, who had lived in Japan long enough to familiarize 
himself with the Japanese culture and custom, was for a long 
time carefree about the necessity for specific job 
descriptions and was a believer in on-the-job-training 
(OJT). However, he came to feel the necessity of more 
specific assignments and training because the new employees 
were "not aggressive enough to look for their own jobs" like 
the more experienced staff had been left to do. Unlike the 
Japanese, the older staff members considered Randy and 
Carl's lack of experience a disadvantage that created the 
absolute necessity of providing them with concrete 
assignments and training.
The arrival of Hayashi brought further chaos to the 
understanding of job descriptions. His future title, the 
manager of sales administration, demanded that he learn 
every job performed by the sales administrative staff. For 
a long time, however, the management did not make it clear 
that Hayashi would become the "boss" of the sales 
administrative staff in the future. Consequently, the staff 
members were perplexed with this man "who tried to do 
everything." Marge, who had worked the longest at MTI among 
the administrative staff, felt "a power problem" when 
Hayashi, a temporary helper in her mind, gave her an order 
to report all the problems to him, rather than to Yamano. 
(Yamano, who wished to keep his accessibility, later
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overruled Hayashi's order.) Rather than considering Hayashi 
as a future "boss," all the American staff regarded him as 
an accountant from the accounting department of Kogu. In 
actuality, however, he had never belonged to the accounting 
department at Kogu. Rather, he "disliked" accounting and 
wanted to "stay away from it as much as possible." His 
responsibility, according to Takenaka, covered overseeing 
the entire sales administrative work and "accounting was 
[only] a part of it." Once again, this misunderstanding 
over the role of Hayashi was a case of ineffective 
communication regarding the responsibility of each 
individual.
The management sensed the confusion in the lowered 
morale of the staff. On behalf of other staff members,
Marge talked with Yamano to express her concern over the 
problems: the management was not giving Randy and Carl 
proper assignments and training and Hayashi was acting like 
a boss. Marge thought Yamano had to be informed because he 
had "no idea how disastrous" the situation was. The crisis 
of leadership, the management's inability to communicate the 
basic messages that once manifested in Takenaka's yelling 
incident, had not improved. The situation continued to 
deteriorate. As a result, in the face of this chaos, the 
Japanese began expressing a need for a comprehensive 
"manual" that would not only include clear job descriptions 
but also how the jobs should be performed.
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This need for the creation of a "manual" was the first 
open acknowledgement by the Japanese of the need to 
streamline the structure of MTI and to create formal job 
definitions and methods of training. They felt it necessary 
to start carefully supervising and controlling the 
activities of the Americans by defining their positions 
clearly and assigning them to particular slots. However, 
like "job description," "manual" remained a foreign concept 
to the Japanese. They continued to use the English term 
"manual" (pronounced ma-nu-a-ru) in their conversation; they 
had no equivalent word in Japanese. Through OJT, rotation 
of jobs, and a strong commitment to the company (rather than 
to one's own work), the Japanese had been working without 
any "manual." Sonoda, who holds an undergraduate degree in 
Law, remembered how he was "thrown into" sales calls without 
much knowledge of tools or "how-to" in sales. The customers 
became frustrated and yelled at him, which in turn forced 
him to learn more about tools. Through trial-and-error on 
the job, he had gained a comprehensive knowledge of tools 
and machinery including the ability to discern the needs of 
the customers from rough sketches completed by the 
engineers. Likewise, Yamano, who represents Boeki— one of 
the largest companies in the world, had never worked with a 
"manual." Yamano, who majored in Spanish, had been involved 
in plant exports to various countries. He learned the
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extensive knowledge of "how-to" in plant export, an 
incredibly complex job differing from country to country and 
from one kind of plant to another, through on-the-job 
experience and training. Considering these experiences of 
the Japanese, it may be said that a practical reason 
prevented the Japanese from making a "manual": they did not 
know how to make it because they did not have a concrete 
understanding of what a "manual" really was. In other 
words, they did not have a manual for making a "manual."
Another reason seems to have prevented the management 
from making a "manual." Inherent in the minds of the 
Japanese at MTI was a scepticism that if they delineated 
each staff member*s realm of responsibility, she or he would 
not go beyond that prescription. Coming from a culture that 
valued generalists, the Japanese managers could not satisfy 
themselves with specialists. They were already seeing the 
disturbing result of specialization of work among the 
suppliers. Aside from the fact that the suppliers were not 
trustworthy (one of the first things the Japanese learned 
early in their first year of business), the Japanese always 
felt frustrated because the suppliers usually assigned only 
one sales representative to MTI and no one else could 
follow-up the person*s job. "*I don't know' is a typical 
American stuff," griped Sonoda, "In Japan, 'I don't know' is 
not acceptable. If you belong to the same company, you 
should be able to take care of others' jobs."
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Although the Japanese regarded the staff at MTI as 
"better than normal Americans," they feared that a "manual" 
could cause the same phenomenon among the staff: they would 
cease to work when they had fulfilled their stated job.
This was far from acceptable for the management. Moreover, 
if the management described every aspect of the job, the 
staff would not be able to cope with exceptions, which the 
Japanese considered a "specialty" at MTI. As indicated in 
phase one (chapter III), a close cooperation ("destiny 
sharing") between the Japanese supplier and customer is 
considered a unique strength that brings success to Japanese 
companies. Not surprisingly, at MTI, the Japanese 
emphasized such an unusual cooperation, even though the 
requirement by the customers to follow formal paperwork 
often trapped the Japanese. They took pride in their 
"flexibility" which was synonymous with satisfying 
exceptional requests by the customers. When Sonoda received 
phone calls at home on Saturday or Sunday from a customer 
asking for tools, he would try to deliver them. The 
Japanese wondered whether, after making a "manual," the 
American staff would become less flexible and more 
specialized, an idea that disturbed them, to say the least.
In this way, while feeling the need to create a 
"manual" in the face of confusion among the American staff, 
the Japanese remained helplessly frustrated in their
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inability and hesitation to create a "manual.” Grudgingly, 
the Japanese who felt triumphant over American business 
admitted that they were "way behind" in their "technology of 
making a manual." They resented the fact that they had to 
create a "manual." After all, it was something 
"unnecessary" by Japanese standards. And if anything of the 
sort was made in Japan at all, the managers would only have 
needed to affix their seals as an affirmation, after the 
diligent and capable subordinates created everything (Nakane 
1970: 69). On the contrary, the Japanese at MTI had to try 
to create a "manual" for their subordinate American staff 
members. In a sense, then, by Japanese standards, the 
management at MTI did not have "subordinates."
The Japanese frustration that triggered an outburst of 
anger began to reveal itself, once again, but this time 
gradually in the management's loss of enthusiasm to retain 
the "family" atmosphere. The Japanese who had carefully and 
consciously created the "family" at MTI began to doubt its 
value and meaning. The management attributed its inability 
to communicate with and control the staff effectively to the 
freedom the staff was enjoying. The Japanese began 
suspecting they had been too tolerant. They feared that they 
had "indulged" the Americans so much that the staff members 
regarded the management as "soft." "We must tighten up the 
control where it's necessary," said Yamano.
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Disintegration of the faith in "family” began to show 
itself in the kitchen. The place of conversation/ laughter/ 
and friendship at the lunch table started to change.
Takenaka suggested that everyone take lunch at his or her 
own discretion, not altogether. This was overruled by 
Yamano, who was most responsible for creating the sense of 
"family." However, Yamano himself began going home at lunch 
hour, Sonoda was often out on business calls, and Takenaka 
often brought his own lunch. The kitchen lost its 
joviality. People ate quietly and returned quickly to their 
desks— to their alcoves. No one cooked in the kitchen 
anymore. There were no more doughnuts. Drinks, which were 
always free, became 25$.
The generally amicable relationship between the 
Japanese and Americans remained the same on the surface. 
There was occasional laughter and excitement in the office. 
Once, Marge brought a cake for Hayashi's birthday. But the 
ambience was quiet and less empathic than Yamano's birthday 
party two years before when everyone eagerly joined in 
hilarity to celebrate the day with crackers, presents, and a 
cake.
A series of crises that challenged the basic cultural 
assumptions of the Japanese characterized the third phase of 
MTI. The management came to realize that a "manual," a 
comprehensive document encompassing job descriptions and
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training methods, needed to be created. But this 
realization did not make the process of creating a "manual" 
a smooth one. While the Japanese felt the necessity of 
controlling the American staff members to avoid confusion by 
creating a "manual," which they did not know how to create, 
they feared the control would deprive the staff members of 
any potential to become generalists. In other words, while 
the Japanese at MTI keenly wished to create a "manual" 
because they felt the staff members were left too "free" and 
needed to be controlled, the managers possessed strong 
qualms about specifying the jobs too much because that might 
deprive their subordinates of the freedom to venture into 
unspecified job responsibilities. This vertiginous way of 
thinking was never resolved in phase three. Though the 
Japanese had determined to "do something" about the 
situation, they had not yet learned what to do.
Chapter VI 
Conclusion
In less than three years, the priority of the Japanese 
managers at MTI has shifted from establishing a "family" 
atmosphere in the office to creating a "manual," although 
they are still ambivalent about its value because they 
believe in the idea of a company "family" comprised of 
generalists. For the Japanese management, ’family" and 
"manual" are not compatible concepts. Therefore, the effort 
of the Japanese to create a harmonious office under a 
people-oriented management has been superseded by an effort 
to establish a more mechanical and hierarchical relationship 
between the Japanese and Americans by assigning each 
individual staff member to a particular slot.
There are three main reasons why a "manual" became 
necessary at MTI. First, the rapid growth of business that 
necessitated the introduction of a computer system and 
increase in personnel made some distinctions of 
responsibilities among the individuals inevitable. 
Consequently, the Japanese divided the company into sales 
and sales administration divisions.
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Second, despite this general distinction made by the 
Japanese management, the Americans at MTI were used to 
working with more specific assignments from their previous 
jobs, rather than working as generalists within a broader 
category. For example, Marge had been working in an 
American company where everyone specialized in a particular 
job and did not share their jobs with the others in the 
office because "if others could do your job, you could 
easily be replaced." The American staff at MTI was 
accustomed to Tayloristic "scientific management" where 
employees were classified and tabulated under "rules, laws, 
and formula" (Taylor 1911s 36).
Third, the Americans wanted to ascertain their 
significance in the office through clear definitions of 
their positions as described in a "manual." The American 
staff members felt uncomfortable because the Japanese 
management monopolized all the power in the office— a kind 
of power in a corporate organization that "allows people to 
get things done, to mobilize resources, to get and use 
whatever it is that a person needs for the goals he or she 
is attempting to make" (Kanter 1977: 166). Consequently, 
the Americans who were "powerless inside an authority 
structure" became "rules minded in response to the limited 
options for power in their situation" (Kanter 1977: 192).
The staff members needed "rules" that they could refer to in 
order to assure their roles in the office.
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The Japanese monopolized the "power" at MTI not only by 
assigning every American to the staff level and keeping the 
management homogeneous, but also by taking advantage of 
their affiliation with the parent companies and their 
language skill. As in most other Japanese multinational 
firms, MTI•s tie with its parent companies is crucial 
(Yoshino 1976: 169): they assist the company with various 
aspects of its operation, such as determining business 
strategies, providing information about customers and 
products, and arranging financial matters. Everyday the 
Japanese at MTI keep in close contact with their superiors, 
subordinates, and friends at Boeki and Kogu by calling, 
faxing to and telexing to Japan. Membership in the parent 
companies is essential for the management. In fact, the 
parent companies assure this strong tie by choosing all the 
management personnel at MTI. Sooner or later, Yamano, 
Takenaka, and Sonoda will be recalled to Japan and replaced 
by other Japanese from Boeki and Kogu. The American staff 
members, on the other hand, do not have any direct 
connection with the parent companies. For example, when the 
Americans need to obtain information or goods from Japan, 
they must always work through the Japanese, who will in turn 
contact Japan on their behalf.
Language difference also enables the Japanese to 
monopolize the "power" at MTI because the Americans know
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only English (except for Scott, who has some Japanese verbal 
communication skill), whereas the Japanese know both English 
and Japanese. Although by no means are the Japanese fluent 
in English, their knowledge of both languages gives them two 
advantages over the American staff. First, the Americans* 
lack of knowledge of the Japanese language prevents them 
from obtaining readily available information in the office 
such as conversation among the Japanese, fax and telex 
messages from Japan, brochures and catalogs in Japanese.
The Japanese management can easily monopolize the 
information by not translating important messages written in 
Japanese and by communicating in Japanese when confidential 
discussions are required. Second, unlike the Japanese, the 
Americans cannot monopolize the information in their 
language because the Japanese can read letters, catalogs, 
quotations, and other essential documents written in 
English. In addition, thanks to the open style office, the 
Japanese can closely supervise the intra- and inter-office 
conversation of the Americans in English.
Increase in business volume, the prior experiences of 
the American staff members, and deprivation of power by the 
Japanese through the use of differences in their titles and 
knowledge of language brought the issue of "manual" to the 
surface at MTI. To the mind of the Japanese, this "manual" 
ran counter to the idea of "family," which is a typical
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characteristic of the Japanese management (Johnson & Ouchi 
1974, Clark 1979: 40, Ibe 1980, Itami 1987).
In the Japanese company where relationships among the 
members are kept close throughout their lifetime, a "manual" 
that clearly defines each individual's job in writing is not 
necessary because people are supposed to sense what their 
superiors and colleagues expect. That is, communication 
often takes "non verbal forms? one is expected to read the 
minds of others without resorting to verbal articulation" 
(Yoshino 1976: 167). Because the Japanese at MTI came from 
such an environment, one of their frequent complaints about 
their American subordinates was, "Why do we have to tell 
them everything they need to do?" Sonoda said, "In Japan, 
you can expect your subordinates to do 100% work with only 
50% instruction. In America, you have to give 100% to 
expect 100%!"
Nakane substantiates this value of generalists in the 
Japanese company by indicating that in a Japanese 
organization, "responsibility is diffused through the group 
as a whole" and there is an "absence of clearly 
differentiated roles for each" (Nakane 1970: 80, 81). 
Therefore, "there are no clear-cut spheres or divisions of 
responsibility between the manager and his subordinates, and 
the entire group becomes one functional body in which all 
individuals, including the manager, are amalgamated into a
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single entity" (Nakane 1970: 69). The establishment of a 
"manual" that defines each individuals realm of 
responsibility reverses the Japanese assumption of a 
group-oriented approach to jobs. Therefore, for the 
Japanese at MTI, the attempt to implement a "manual" came 
concomitant with the loss of faith in creating a "family" 
that incorporated their American subordinates.
Although the Japanese have not been able to create a 
"manual" because of their ambivalence toward and their lack 
of knowledge about how to make one, the emphasis on "manual" 
and the simultaneous decline in "family" is likely to 
intensify at MTI in the future. A continual expansion of 
business will require the company to hire more American 
personnel, whereas the number of Japanese will remain the 
same because visa acquisition to work at MTI is becoming 
increasingly difficult. The growth in business will also 
allow MTI to open a branch office in another state. In that 
case, the Japanese management envisions promoting an 
American staff member (most likely Scott) for the first time 
to a managerial position as a branch manager. However, in 
order assure a smooth operation of the branch office, the 
management considers effective supervision essential. For 
example, Takenaka thinks that in order to effectively 
supervise, every sale must be reported daily to the main 
office. In any case, the supervision and control of
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Americans will be an important concern for the Japanese 
management.
Other observers of Japanese companies in the United 
States often comment about the duality between the Japanese 
and Americans (Kidahashi 1987), which, at MTI, emerged after 
the concept of "family" started to break down. Although 
American scholars frequently discuss the value and necessity 
of adopting the people-oriented management style of the 
Japanese company (Ouchi 1981, Pascal & Athos 1981, Lu 1987), 
it seems that the Japanese are not too successful in 
importing and adapting their own system to American soil.
The Japanese at MTI certainly tried the Japanese way, but 
after a little more than two years, the Japanese way has 
become applicable only among the Japanese who themselves 
still value harmony and consensus. In the same way that the 
Japanese thought American suppliers and customers were 
inefficient and untrustworthy, the Japanese managers at MTI 
lost confidence in their American staff. After all the 
effort to create harmony in the office, duality steadily and 
powerfully defines the Japanese-American relationships at 
MTI.
NOTES
Chapter I
1. A paper presented by Justin D. Niehoff at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Anthropological Association on 
November 30, 1990, explains the lack of unified 
organizational culture in a U.S.-based Japanese bank because 
of cultural clashes. Due to the bank's policy, Niehoff's 
paper is not available for quotation. In another 
unpublished paper, Jill Kleinberg supports cultural clashes 
within a Japanese computer firm in California.
2. See for example, a series of articles in The Los 
Angeles Times from July 11 to July 13, 1988, and an article, 
"Do it my way," in The Economist, 24-30 November 1990: 74+
3. I have created the pseudonym, Metric Tools 
International, Inc., in order to protect the identity of the 
company.
Chapter II
1. Figures are taken from a community audit published in
1991 by the city's economic development board.
2. 1989 figure.
3. 1990 figures (Boeki and Boeki America).
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[Notes to pages 6 - 16]
4. First innovated by Toyota Motor Company and implemented 
in the 1960s, "Just-In-Time" service is a system in which 
parts are produced and delivered just before they are needed 
at the factory lines in order to keep the inventory cost as 
low as possible. "Just-In-Time" has become a prevalent 
production system in Japan and is now being used in the 
United States by companies such as General Motors.
5. The total sales figures of the company has fluctuated 
from $4 million in the first year to $6.2 million in the 
second year to $4.5 million in the third year. However, 
many of the sales in the first two years consisted of large 
and expensive (up to $2.5 million) machines imported from 
Japan that were needed before beginning the operation of 
customer transplants. Sales of tools, a major growth 
indicator for MTI, has continued to increase all three 
years. In the third year, MTI sold $2.5 million worth of 
tools in contrast with $1.9 million the year before.
6. In order to protect the identity of the individuals, 
names used in this paper are pseudonyms. I refer to the 
Japanese by their last names and Americans by their first 
names because Americans in the office are always called by 
their first names, whereas the Japanese tend to use last 
names in the conversations among themselves (in my case,
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[Notes to pages 17 - 27]
being the youngest in the office I always attached an 
honorific ending "san," which is omitted in this paper).
The Americans, on the other hand, call the Japanese by their 
first names.
Chapter III
1. Many articles and books published in Japan discuss the 
decline of American business. For example, the translation 
of Made In America (by Michael Dourtouzos et. al.), which 
explores the cause of decline in international 
competitiveness of various American industries, has been 
well received in Japan. Noboru Makino, one of Japan's 
well-known business critics, writes that America has become 
Japan's "Manchuria" because its major exports to Japan haven 
been reduced to products such as lumber, coal, wheat and 
corn (1981: 50).
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